The Visegrád Four (V4) — Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia — were once seen as models of democratic transformation after the fall of communism. Formed in 1991 through the Visegrád Declaration, the group aimed to promote regional cooperation and support each other’s efforts to join NATO and the European Union. In the early 2000s, they achieved these goals, and many hoped they would become leading examples of democratic success in Central Europe.

But in recent years, this success story has taken a troubling turn. Since the early 2010s, several V4 governments have shifted toward “illiberal democracy,” using nationalist rhetoric, weakening judicial independence, and increasing control over the media and civil society. While the motivations and methods differ across the four countries, the overall trend is clear: democratic backsliding is no longer a theoretical concern — it is happening within the EU itself. These developments now raise serious questions about how the EU should respond when its own member states erode the very values they committed to uphold.

Figure 1: Visegrád Group members and other member states of the European Union

Hungary: A Model for Illiberal Rule

In 2014, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán made headlines when he openly endorsed the idea of an “illiberal democracy”. Since then, Hungary has seen a steady concentration of power in the hands of the ruling Fidesz party. The government has redrawn electoral laws, limited judicial independence, and weakened checks and balances. Media pluralism has declined sharply, with independent outlets being shut down or absorbed by pro-government business figures.

Civil society has also suffered. Laws passed in 2017 and 2018 restricted foreign-funded NGOs, particularly those focusing on human rights and migration. The European Court of Justice later ruled these laws unlawful. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government ruled by decree for extended periods, using emergency powers to further reduce parliamentary oversight. In response, the EU froze €21 billion of funding, in different areas from fisheries to home affairs, under new financial conditionality rules. Another example of undermining democracy values in Hungary is the creation of the Sovereignty Protection Office, which targets critics and NGOs under broad claims of defending sovereignty, allowing Orbán’s government to suppress dissent and sidestep democratic accountability

Poland: From Erosion to a Turning Point

Since 2015, Poland has experienced major democratic setbacks. The Law and Justice (PiS) party, Mateusz Morawiecki as the prime minister, implemented reforms that politicized the judiciary and challenged the separation of powers. A controversial disciplinary chamber for judges led the EU to impose fines of €1 million per day until changes were made. Billions of euros in EU funds were withheld as a result of concerns over rule-of-law violations.

However, in October 2023, a shift occurred. The opposition coalition, led by former European Council President Donald Tusk, won parliamentary elections. The new government has pledged to restore judicial independence and rule of law in order to regain Poland’s position as one of the EU’s pivotal players. Yet, experts warn that rebuilding Poland’s democratic institutions will take time. Damage to the courts and public media cannot be undone overnight. Another factor hindering this process is political and societal division in poland.

Czech Republic: The Shadow of Babiš

The Czech Republic has avoided the deep democratic erosion seen in Hungary or Poland, but concerns remain from the period when Andrej Babiš served as prime minister (2017–2021). A billionaire and media owner, Babiš blurred the lines between political and media power. Though he transferred his businesses to trust funds, he retained indirect control over major outlets like MF DNES and Lidové noviny, raising serious concerns about media independence and political influence.

Today, Babiš leads the opposition and still uses his media platforms to shape public opinion. According to Freedom House, while Czechia’s democratic institutions remain strong, media pluralism remains fragile. Financial pressures, high ownership concentration, and proposed tax hikes on print outlets all threaten the future of independent journalism. Vigilance remains essential to prevent a slide into the kinds of illiberal dynamics seen elsewhere in the region.

Slovakia: A Worrying Return

Slovakia faced its own democratic reckoning after the 2018 murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová.The killing, linked to Kuciak’s reporting on corruption, led to mass protests and the resignation of Prime Minister Robert Fico. Some of those involved were convicted, but the man suspected of ordering the murder, businessman Marian Kočner, was acquitted in 2023, raising fresh concerns about impunity.

In recent elections, Fico’s Smer party returned to power, prompting worries that past abuses could resurface. He campaigned on nationalist and anti-EU themes, part of a broader trend across Europe where populist leaders use discontent to win support (Al Jazeera, 2023). Human rights groups are closely monitoring whether institutional reforms from the past five years will endure, especially as recent legislative changes, such as the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and the restructuring of the public broadcaster, have raised concerns about the erosion of checks on government power and the independence of media in Slovakia.

How the EU Has Responded

For years, the EU struggled to act decisively. The so-called Article 7 procedure, which allows sanctions against member states violating EU values, was launched against Hungary and Poland but stalled due to political divisions. However, from 2020 onwards, the EU began to use material sanctions — freezing funds through new budgetary rules and linking payments to respect for the rule of law.

A recent study shows the EU’s shift from passive tolerance to active enforcement against democratic backsliding was driven by two factors: growing public awareness across Europe regarding democratic backsliding (“transnational salience”) and fears that illiberal governments were undermining common EU policies (“negative intergovernmental spillover”). In other words, enforcement became politically necessary not only for values but also to keep the EU functioning.

What Comes Next?

The story of the Visegrád Four is still unfolding. Poland may be on a path to democratic renewal, while Slovakia stands at a fragile crossroads. The Czech Republic remains stable but faces pressure from political influence. Hungary continues to challenge EU institutions, testing how far the bloc will go to defend its values. Meanwhile, Orbán and Fico’s affinity with Putin raises concerns about European cohesion and risks weakening the EU’s stance on human rights and solidarity with Ukraine.

For human rights organisations, this is a critical moment. Local activists need support, cross-border cooperation matters, and EU tools must be used more firmly. Democracy doesn’t fall all at once—it fades, unless we act to protect it.

Mohammad Mohseni
ISHR Intern